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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of
llAYMOND II. "TILLSON,
Deceased,
EDNA R. 'VILLSON, Exet'.utrix,

Appellant.

Case No.
12501

STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal involves a determination of the Utah
inheritance tax upon the assets of the Estate of Ray, mond H. \Villson, deceased.
DISPOSITION IN LO,V"ER COURT
The matter of inheritance taxes was brought before
the trial court pursuant to an Order to Show Cause is1

sued upon the petition of Edna R. 'i\rillson, Executrix
of the Estate of Raymond H. 'Villson, deceased. The
matter was heard upon stipulated facts. An Order fa.
voring the State Tax Commission of Utah was made and
entered on April 7, 1971.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order favoring
the State Tax Commission of Utah and a judicial declaration that the State Tax Commission of U tab approve
of and consent to the State of Utah Inheritance Tax Return as filed by appellant, that the State Tax Commission of Utah approve the sum of $15,425.07 as the full
amount of Utah inheritance tax upon the aforesaid
estate, and that the State Tax Commission of Utah issue
waivers of lien on all the assets of the estate of Raymond
II. Willson, deceased.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Raymond II. 'Villson died testate on the 23rd day
of December, 1967, in Ogden, County of 'Veber, State
of Utah (R. 1). The Last 'V-ill and Testament of Ray·
mond H. 'Villson, deceased, was admitted to probate by
Order of the District Court of the Second Judicial Dis·
trict in and for
eber County, dated March 18, 191i8
( R. 9), and Edna R. 'Villson was issued Letters Testa·
mentary in the matter of the Estate of Raymond H.
'Villson, deceased, on March 18, 1968 (R. 8).

"T

2

Several years prior to his death decedent, Raymond
II. \Villson, and his wife, the executrix herein, owned
land in South Ogden, 'Veber County, as tenants in cominon with equal undiYi<led interests ( R. 69 and 102) . In
October of 19ul, Raymond H. \Yillson and Edna May
Willson, as sellers, entered into an Agreement to sell the
major portion of the lands involved ( R. u9, 95 and 102).
The Agreement contained most of the standard provisions of a typieal Cniform Real Estate Contract (R. 69
and 10:.!). Xo deeds were placed in escrow, nor were any
<leccls exeeuted at the time of the Agreement ( R. 69 and
lO:l). Sueh doeuments were contemplated to be given at
the time of the periodic releases after payments had been
made <luring installment periods ( R. 69 and 102).
C nder the terms of the Agreement, the buyers took
possession of the premises upon making the payment due
on Oetober 1, Hl63 (R. 84 and 103). The buyers were to
pay all property taxes on the property, as well as to make
payments to the \Veber Basin 'Vater District (R. 84
and 103).
The Agreement was signed by the decedent and
also the suniving widow, who signed as a seller (R.
IOI) .

.A not her real estate eontraet, "·hich was executed
under s;milar circumstances, Clwered a much smaller
lrad of land in the South Ogden area of 'Veber County
m. 01).
3

In preparing the Inheritance Tax Return for the
State of U tab, the executrix, as surviving widow, excluded one-third of the value of the unpaid portion due
to her deceased husband as being a "legal or equitable
estate in real property possessed by the husband at any
time during the marriage, * * *" pursuant to the provisions of Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (R
69 and 102). The State Tax Commission of Utah disallowed the exclusion, claiming that by entering into the
real estate contract, the decedent and his wife invoked
the doctrine of equitable conversion so as to convert the
real estate to personal property and thereby remove it
from the application of the widow's statutory one-third
interest ( R. 69 and 102) .
The agreed amount of inheritance tax at issue
$1,937.78 (R. 69 and 102).

1s

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DOCTRINE OF "EQUI'l'·
ABLE CONVERSION" IS DESIGNED TO
CARRY OUT THE "INTENT" OF PARTIES
PRIVY TO THE TRANSACTION.
The inheritance tax laws of the State of Utah apply
to both real and personal property; however, it is still
necessary in this special case to determine whether the
property is to be considered as real or personal for pur·
poses of inheritance taxation. This is so because the

\\'idow' s statutory interest, as established by Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, Section 74-4-3, applies only to "legal
or equitable estates in real property," and because the
rtah Supreme Court has held this interest to be exempt
frnm inheritance tax. This statutory dower interest has
hren held to be exempt from inheritance tax by a line of
cases beginning with In re Bullen's Estate, 47 Utah 96,
151 P. 533 (1915), and continuing through In re
C!/stlcs' Estate, 23 Utah 2d 4, 455 P.2d 628 (1969).
The State Tax Commission of Utah claims that by
entering into the real estate contract, the decedent and
wife invoked the doctrine of equitable conversion so
as to convert the real property to personal property. The
Utah State Tax Commission then reasons that the properly, in its converted state, is not subject to the widow's
statutory one-third interest and is therefore taxable in
its entirety.
This reasoning of the State Tax Commission of
Utah relies upon application of the doctrine of "equitable c01wersion." That doctrine is defined in 27 Am. J ur.
Zd, Equitable Conversion, Section 1, as follows:
"Equitable conversion is that constructive alteration in the nature and character of property
whereby, in equity, real estate is for certain purposes considered as personalty, or whereby pe:rsonaltv, for similar considerations, is regarded as
and in either instance, it is deemed to
real
he transmissible and descendable in its converted
form."
5

Sections 1 and 3 of 27 Am. J ur. 2d, Equitable Con.
version, state the basis of the doctrine of equitable con.
version and its limitations. Section 1 states that the doc.
trine "was adopted for the purpose of giving effect to
the intention of the testator, settlor, or contracting parties, * * *" and Section 3 states that the "application of
the doctrine is always withheld where its effect would be
contrary to the intention of the testator, settlor, o:- contracting parties." (Emphasis added.)
This same basis for the doctrine of equitable conversion was recognized in the case of Allred v. Allred,
15 Utah 2d 396, P. 2d 791 ( 1964), which is the only
case found where the doctrine of equitable conversion
has been recognized in the State of Utah. The Allred
case involved a real estate contract entered into between
parents and child, and the litigation which ensued in·
volved parties to that instrument and those claiming
some right through other parties to that instrument. It
is significant to note that there had been an actual delivery of executed deeds to an escrow holder and that
this Court pointed out that it saw no good reason to withhold the application of the doctrine of equitable conver·
sion. This Court specifically recognized that the doctrine
of equitable conversion was applicable only to give effect
to the intention of the testator. In relating the doctrine
to the facts of that case, it was said that the application
of the doctrine served to carry out the apparent intent
of the vendors.
The doctrine of equitable conversion is not a fixed
6

rule of law, hut proceeds on equitable principles which
take into account the result to be accomplished. It is to
be invoked only for certain purposes and when necessity
and justice so require. The doctrine is a mere fiction and
rests solely upon principles of equity. 27 Am. J ur. 2d,
Equitable Conversion, Sections 1 and 3. Furthermore,
equitable co1wersio11 of property is not favored in law.
27 Am. J ur. 2d, Equitable Conversion, Section 3; 18
C..J.S., Conversion, Section 7. Of equitable conversion,
the last cited authority makes the following statement:
"It has been said that the law does not favor conversion, and it has been said that there is a presumption against application of the doctrine."

These statements to the effect that the law does not
favor application of the doctrine of equitable conversion
be contrasted with the statement found in In re
Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327, 259 P. 2<l 595, 602
( Hl53), a case relied upon by the State Tax Cammi§<.
sion of Utah. In the Madsen case, this Court was called
upon to determine whether a widow had released her
statutory dower. In making its decision, this Court recognized that ''the right of dower or its statutory equivalent has always been highly favored in the law."
One of the most signifit:ant limitations upon the application of the doctrine of equitable c01wersion is recognized by 27 Am. J ur. 2d, Equitable Conversion, Section 3, and 18,\C.J.S., Conversion, Section 2. Those sections recognize that the doctrine of equitable conversion
not applied so as to affect the claims of persons who

7

are not parties to the instrument or who are not claiming
through the instrument as privy to a party. These authorities respectfully state as follows:
"Nor, it has been held, will the <lodrine be extended so as to effect a conversion as to persons
whose claims or rights to the property are purely
incidental, and not at all connected with its devolution or transfer from the owner or through
the instrument." 27 Am. J ur. 2d Equitable Conversion, Section 3.
"Conversion does not take place as to persons
whose claims or rights to the property are purely
incidental and unconnected with its devolution
or transfer from the author or through the instrument." 18 C. J. S., Conversion, Section 2.
The State Tax Commission of Utah was not a party
to the instrument which is claimed to have effected a conYersion. Similarly, the State Tax Commission of Utah is
not claiming through the instrument which it relies upon.
The claim of the State Tax Commission of Utah is purely incidental and is made irrespective of the parties to
the Agreement.
The Utah cases relied upon by the State Tax Commission of Utah, Allred v. Allred, cited supra, and In
re Madsen's Estate, cited supra, both involved litigation
between parties claiming through the instrument. In the
Allred case the doctrine of equitable conversion was applied in favor of the decedent's child and against the de·
cedent's administrator. Both parties claimed through the
instrument. In that case executed deeds had been de8

lirered to an escrow holder under escrow instructions
11hich were held to have created a joint tenancy. The
child of the decedent, who was a party to the instruments,
daimed that the instruments effected an equitable conrersion and created a joint tenancy. The administrator
of decendent' s estate similarly claimed through the instruments under his own theory. In the "ftladsen case, the
litigation was between the vendor's widow, who was a
1igner of the instrument, and the vendee. In the Madsen case, at page 604 of the Pacific Reporter, this court
expressly recognized the privity of contract between the
daimants.
The State Tax Commission of Utah has recognized
that the doctrine of equitable conversion is applicable
for only certain purposes ( R. 90). However, the State
Tax Commission of Utah has obstinately refused to
make a careful analysis to determine what those limitations are. In truth, the State Tax Commission of Utah
is merely giving lip service to the admitted limitations
upon the doctrine of equitable conversion. Meanwhile,
the State Tax Commission of Utah continues its callous
attitude of applying the doctrine of equitable conversion
indiscriminately.
POINT II.
THE DOCTRINE OF "EQUITABLE CON\'ERSION" DOES NOT APPLY IN THE
,\HEA OF TAXATION ACCORDING TO THE
'VEIGHT OF AUTHORITY.
9

That the doctrine of equitable conversion should
not be invoked to subject property to taxation is a cor. I
ollary of the rule that the doctrine of equitable conver- !
sion depends on the circumstances under which it is invoked and is not a fixed rule of law. Similarly, taxing .
authorities are not in privity or standing with the parties
to a real estate contract, and any claim by a taxing authority is merely incidental. Furthermore, it should not
be assumed that a testator would intentionally subject
his property to an increased tax. That the doctrine of
equitable conversion should not be recognized in tax
cases was stated as follows in 18 C.J.S., Conversion,
Section 2:
1

:

1

1

"This doctrine should not be invoked merely to
subject property to taxation, especially where the
jurisdiction of different states is involved."
Numerous cases support the statement above quoted from 18 C.J.S. That the doctrine of equitable conversion has no application to tax cases has been variously
stated as fallows:
"The doctrine of equitable conversion has no ap·
plication in the instant case. This well-established
doctrine cannot be invoked to affect the liability
of property to taxation by the State or by its political subdivisions." Latta v. Jen/Lins, 200 N. C.
255, 156 S. E. 857, 859 (Hl3I).

"The doctrine of equitable conversion may not
be relied on to subject property to taxation or
shift the lien of the tax from the real property
transferable to the fund." Il eymann v. Diane,

10

252 N. Y. 15\J,

ltio, rnu

N. E. 124, 126 (1929).

"Seeonclly, the law of equitable conversion ought
not to be invoked merely to subject property to
taxation, especially when the question is one of
jurisdietion between different states. * **"McCurdy v. McCurdy, rn1 .Mass. 248, 83 N. E. 881,
882 ( 1908).
In the case of Laurel IIill Cemcntery Association

r. Citlj and County of San Francisco, 81 Cal. App. 2d

18.t. P. 2d mo, 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947), the taxpayer sought to invoke the doetrine of equitable conversion in aid of an exemption from taxation. In denying
the application of that doctrine, the court made the following general statement concerning the application of
the doetrine of equitable conversion to the field of taxation:
"The appellant cites no authority in this state
where the doctrine of equitable conversion has
been applied to the field of taxation and apparently none is to be found. * * *"
In the case of New Jersey Highway Authority v.
llcnry A. Raensch Coal Company, 40 X. J. Super. 355,
l:W A. 2cl 83 (Super. Ct. N. J. 1956), the taxing authority attempted to apply the doctrine of equitable con1ersion to enable the collection of a real property tax.
There the town was attempting the conversion of a fund
lo real property. As to the doctrine of equitable converthe New Jersey court said on page 86:
"Nor can the town find support in the doetrine of
c<1uitablc conYcrsion which it also advances. That

11

concept was devised to assure justice between the
parties to a real property transaction. It is a fie. :
tion of law and, as such, cannot be extended beyond the special purposes wluch it was created to
serve. It does not transmute a fund into real
estate so as to subject the fund to taxation as real
property. The land remains land and the fund remains personal insofar as subsequent local taxation is concerned."
·

The most convincing case is In re DeStuers' Estate,
739 (Surr. Ct. N. Y. 1950). In that case ,
a non-resident alien owned an undivided interest in real
property in the county where the lawsuit was commenced. Prior to his death he contracted to convey to his
co-owner. After execution of the contract but prior to
closing, the vendor died. Now York tax law imposed a
death tax (transfer of estate) upon real property of a
non-resident within the state. The respondent or representative of the decedent's estate urged the application
of the doctrine of equitable conversion to show only personal property in New York at the time of death. This
doctrine was accepted by the trial court but rejected
upon appeal.
99 N. Y. S.

In a very thoughtful opinion the court compares the
fiction of the doctrine of equitable conversion with the
actual rights and privileges associated with ownership.
On page 743, the court says:
"However, although a court of equity may thus
treat a realty contract as already executed for
certain purposes, it is clear that unless the rules
of law based upon or growing out of an applica-

12

tion of that doctrine have the combined effect of
substantially terminating the interest of the vendor in the property pnor to conveyance and of
converting his interest into a mere chose in action
for the purchase money, such vendor must be regarded as the owner of the property until such
conveyance is made and his estate must be taxed
therefor. As ownership consists of the aggregate
rights and privileges which are possessed with respect to specific property, the determination as to
whether the vendor remains the owner of the
property prior to the conveyance depends upon
the substantiality of his interest in the land after
the execution of the contract."
The court then discusses and cites authority for
various rights and privileges associated with the vendor's
interest under a real estate contract. A list of the major
rights held by the vendor and referred to in that decision
here follows:
1. Full legal titie to the premises.
2. Y endor' s lien.
3. Right to cancel the contract as a cloud on title

after a default by vendee.

4. Right to hold property and sue for mere

damages.

5. -y cndor of an undivided fraction has right to

partition the premises.

6.

Right to convey complete ownership of the
land to a bona fide purchaser who receives the
property without notice of the contract.

7. The interest of the vendor is subject to levy

under a judgment procured against him, and
13

the land may be sold upon execution, although
the purchaser of the fee with notice of the
contract takes subject thereto.
8. Y endor may maintain an action for wask

against the vendee in possession.

In finally rejecting the doctrine of equitable con·
version, the court quotes from an earlier New York case
as follows:
"The doctrine of equitable conversion, in its application to a decedent's estate, concerns only
those who have come into relations of contract or
privity with decedent or his estate. The fiction of
conversion adjusts rights and imposes equities,
but it cannot change facts and work inequity. In
adopting it the law makes believe that the things
which have arranged to be done have been done,
but this amiable pretense must be confined by the
impulses which inspire it to the persons in privity
with the transaction. There is no equitable need
for an extension to others. Strangers have nothing to do with the reason for its being and nothing
to do with its operation. In the best defined case
of equitable conversion the legal owner of the
lands retains as to persons not in equitable relation to himself all the rights and duties which belong to his seisin."
In the instant case the State Tax Commission of
Utah contends that the vendors, Edna May \Villson and
R. II. \Villson, deceased, have no legal interest in the
real estate. The State Tax Commission of Utah goes so
far as to assert that the appellant does not claim any legal
interest to the real estate against the purchaser (R. 89).

u

This concept of property asserted by the State Tax
Commission is without support. The appellant in this
case, in both her individual capacity and the capacity of
executrix, most certainly does claim an interest in the
real property. The estate of Raymond H. 'iVillson, deceased, and the appellant in her individual capacity hold
full legal title to the premises as stated in the DeStuers
case. The vendees under the real estate contract have an
; equitable interest to the extent of the payments made;
however, the vendors retain full legal title. Furthermore,
the vendors in this case did retain, and do claim, those
other rights and privileges enumerated in the DeStuers
case. It is significant to note that no deeds were placed
' in escrow, nor any deeds executed at the time of the
signing of the agreement ( R. 69 and 102) . It was contemplated by the parties that such documents would be
executed and delivered at the time of the periodic releases ( R. 69 and 102) . In this case the vendors merely
signed an un-recorded real estate contract as sellers of
their respective common and undivided interests (R.

!

101).

The reasoning of the DeStners case was earlier
adopted in In re Paul's Estate, 303 Pa. 330, 154 Atl.
5013 ( 1!)31), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 630 ( 1931). In that
rnse, the decedent was a resident of Pennsylvania and
ha<l died owning real property in New Jersey and Missomi. During his lifetime the decedent had entered info
written contracts for the sale of the New Jersey and
)lissouri lands. As in this case, the decedent had not
C\ccuted deeds. The question posed was whether the

15

doctrine of equitable conversion would apply to subject
the property to a transfer inheritance tax in the State of
Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
the application of the doctrine of equitable conversion
and gave as its reason for so doing that the fee in the land
was still in the vendor. This reasoning is explained in detail in the report found at 78 A.L.R. 779, 782:

'"* * * \Vhile an agreement for sale of land, which
contains a promise to pay the purchase price
agreed upon, is in one sense a chose in action it
differs in essential respects from the ordinary
chose. Aside from the agreement to sell, no such
liability ever did exist. Its basic purpose, as a writing, is to fix the rights of the vendor and the ven·
dee in the land; liability for the purchase price is
but secondary and contingent. The fee in the
land is still in the vendor, and it is the fee which is
to be transferred upon payment of the balance of
the purchase price. In case of default, neither the
vendor nor those standing in his shoes are com·
pelled to sue for that balance in order to be re·
compensed; they may elect to retain the land. In
that event, though the written agreement is still
in their possession, there would be no tr an sf er of
either land or chose in action, and hence there
would be no transfer 'by will or by the intestate
laws,' and the act of l!J19 would have no relation
to the situation then existing. The uncertainty re·
f erred to is conclusive, for to doubt the existenct
of an intention to impose a tax is to conclusive!)
determine that it does not exist."
The question involved in this case, whether the doc
trine of equitable co1wersion should be indiscriminate!)
16

applied, has significance far beyond the facts of this
case. If the doctrine of equitable conversion is applied in
this case, the chances of its being applied in other cases
' will be enhanced. Consequently, a review should be made
of other cases or factual situations where the doctrine of
equitable com·ersion has been asserted. The results obtained under other factual situations should be studied
before the decision in this matter.
The first factual situation will be referred to as a
hypothetical. Suppose that husband A and wife A sell
Black-acre, worth $100,000.00, to husband B and wife
B for a down payment of $10,000.00. Suppose next that
husband A and husband B both die immediately after
the down payment on the real estate contract. Since husban<l B has a paid in equity of only $10,000.00, husband
, B's widow will be entitled to a statutory dower interest
only to the extent of one-third of $10,000.00, and this is
the actual position of the Tax Commission. If the doctrine of equitable conversion is applied as requested by
the State Tax Commission of Utah, wife A will receive
no statutory dower interest in the balance. This result is
grossly inequitable since only 10% of the real property is
being subjected to a widow's statutory dower right.

!

Another factual situation would be similar to that
presented in In re Paul's Estate, cited supra. Presenting
the factual situation by way of hypothetical, let us as'llme that a 'Vyoming resident owned real property in
l'tah and that, prior to his death, he contracted to sell

17

that property. Assume further that the monthly pay.
ments on the real estate contract were being made di.
rectly to the seller in Wyoming and that no deed had
been executed. The question as presented in Paul's
Estate would be identical to the question posed by the
hypothetical if the State of "\\Tyoming attempted to levy
an inheritance tax upon the real property, claiming that
it had been converted to an intangible and was therefore
subject to \Vyoming inheritance tax in the state of the
decedent's domicile. Since no deed had been execute<l
and since the Utah real property was still held in the
name of the \Vyoming resident, an ancillary probate pro·
ceeding would be required in Utah. The question then
arises as to whether Utah would recognize the real prop·
crty as having been converted to an intangible and woul<l
therefore defer the levying of an inheritance tax. It is
submitted that the reasonable and just result would be
obtained only by subjecting the real property to taxation
only in Utah. This result could be obtained only be de·
clining to apply the doctrine of equitable conversion.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Paul's Estate
refused to apply the doctrine of equitable conversion and
refused to subject real property in the foreign jurisdiction to inheritance tax on the theory that it had been con·
Yerted to personal property. In so holding, the court
made the following statement as found in 78 A.L.R.
779, 782:

""\Ve may
in the instant case that it would be
unfortunate, perhaps amazing, that part of the

purchase money representing the value of, and
arising out of, lands located in other states of
which the decedent died seised, may be taxed in
this state, when the lands themselves may not be,
under the fiction that the lands have been conYerted into money; or that the money which the
lands will ultimately produce can be, because a
writing, intended eventually to bring about their
conveyance, may be called a chose in action, when
the same money, representing part of the value
of the land, may be taxed in the other state. * * *"
The applicability of the doctrine of equitable conversion
in determining jurisdiction in payment of succession
taxes is also explained in 42 Am. J ur. 2d, Inheritance,
etc. 'l'axes, Section 173. That section recognizes the
weight of authority to be against the application of the
doctrine of equitable conversion.
"\Vhile there is some authority to the effect that
the state of the testator's domicile may assess a
succession tax upon the value of the real estate
located in another state, which by the will is converted into personalty for the purposes of distribution, the cases have generally denied the applicability of the doctrine of equitable conversion
for such purposes. Indeed, it has been said that
the courts have practically, if not entirely, abandoned the fiction of equitable conversion by the
will of the deceased, of real property situated in
another state, insofar as the imposition of a succession tax is concerned and instead look to the
character of the property at the time of testator's
death. * * *"
Another factual situation where the doctrine of
crp1itable conversion has been asserted is represented by
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the case of Pirst Security Bank of Idaho, National Asso.
ciation v. Rogers, 429 P.2d 386 (Idaho 1967). In that
case defendant Rogers entered into a contract for sale
of real property in December of 1959. Payments were
made by the purchaser to the escrow holder. In January
of 1962 Nez Perze Roller Mills obtained a judgment
against Rogers, which was filed in the appropriate county and became a lien on all real property owned by
Rogers. Subsequently, Fireman's Fund Insurance Company and Credit Adjustment Agency obtained judgments against Rogers. These latter two judgment creditors then levied writs of garnishment against the escrow
holder. The question then arose as to the priority of
liens. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company and Credit
Adjustment llureau contended that the doctrine of
equitable conversion applied so that, after the execution
of the real estate contract, Roger's interest in the property was transformed from an interest in realty to an
interest in personalty to which the judgment lien could
not attach. Nez Perze Roller .Mills contended that the
doctrine of equitable conversion was inapplicable and
that its judgment was a lien upon the interest of Rogers
in the real property.Nez Perze Roller Mills did not con·
tend that its lien was superior to the purchaser's
but recognized its lien to be limited to the extent of the
seller's interest. In holding that the lien of Nez Perze
Roller Mills had priority and that the doctrine of equitable conversion did not apply, the Idaho Supreme Court
made the following statement on page 389:
20

"The doctrine of equitable conversion generally
does not apply to the facts of the instant case. The
majority rule is that a judgment lien against the
vendor after the making of a contract or sale, but
prior to making and delivery of the deed, extends
to all of the vendors interest remaining in the land
and binds the land to the extent of the unpaid
purchase price. (citing authority)"
The doctrine of equitable conversion was also unsuccessfully asserted in the case of First National, Bank
uf Highland Park v. Boston Insurance Company, 17
Ill. 2d 147, 160 N. E. 2d 802 (1959). In that case the
defendant insurance company was the insurer of certain
improved real property under contracts aggregating
750.00. A clause in the insurance contract limited
roverage to the "interest of insured." Subsequently, the
insured entered into a real estate contract to sell for
and the sum of $3,000.00 was paid at execution in .May of 1952. The remainder of $16,000.00 was
tu be paid at closing in November of 1952. The building
was totally destroyed by fire on September 25, 1952. The
buyer had not taken possession but had started to redecorate. The real estate contract called for its voidance in
case of destruction by fire. The insurer was willing to
pay only $16,000.00 as the total interest of the insured.
The insurer's argument was said to rest in part on the
doctrine of equitable conversion. The Illinois Supreme
Court held the doctrine of equitable conversion to be in-:

apnlil'.able in that the contract between the vendor and
1e11dce was not a proper measure of value. As to the doc-
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trine of equitable conversion, the court stated on page

804:

I

"As we see it there are several difficulties with
the position of the insurers. In the first place, it
transplants the doctrine of equitable conversion
into an area where it does not belong. That doctrine was evolved in order to carry out the intention of the parties to the contract. To that end it
acts upon the rights of the parties to the contract
and those who claim under them. But it has frequently been held and stated that it should ha\'e
no effect upon the rights of others. Pomeroy
states the limitation in these terms: 'The
seems to be correctly formulated by saying that
the effects extend only to those persons who claim
or are entitled to the property under or through
the instrument, or directly from or under the
author of the instrument. Some of the cases definitely hold that a conversion takes place no fur- '
ther than is necessary for the purposes of the will
or other instrument.' Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed. Section 1166; * * *"

1

POINT III.
A WIFE'S SIGNATURE ON A REAL
ESTATE CONTRACT AS SELLER OF REAL
PROPERTY TO 'V"HICH SHE IS THE OW.N·
ER OF AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTER
EST AS TEN ANT IN COMMON IS NOT A RELINQUISHMENT TO THE STATE TAX COM·
MISSION OF UTAH OF HER RIGHTS UN·
DER SECTION 74-4-3, UTAH CODE ANNO·
TATED, 1953.
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Although the basi!) for the denial of the widow's
1tatutory dower interest was expressed in the trial court's
memorandum decision ( R. 102) to be that the doctrine
of equitable conversion applies, and although the denial
Ly the State Tax Commission of Utah of the widow's
statutory dower interest in the subject contract was siinilarly based upon an attorney general's opinion, dated
April 12, 1970, to the effect that the doctrine of equitable
conversion did apply, it is felt that a brief reference
)hould be made to the possibility of a relinquishment of
statutory dower by signing the subject contract. It
should be noted that the widow was the owner of a onehalf undivided interest as tenant in common ( R. 102),
and that the widow signed the agreement as a seller (R.
101 and 103).
Only passing mention should be made to the effect
that the law has held a strong preference for widow's
statutory rights in the real estate of their departed husbands, and the law uniformly recognizes that relinquishment of such rights must be clear and unequivocal. This
observation was noted in the case of In re Ma<lsen's
Estate, cited supra.

Only in situations where a real estate contract has
Leen coupled with an escrow agreement, where the wife
has actually executed the deeds and placed them with the
[. depository, is there an apparent split of authority as to
· i 11hcther her signature would constitute a relinquishment.
. · See 25 Am. J ur. 2d, Dower and Courtesy, Section 63.
That section states that some cases take the view that
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final performance of the conditions relates back to the
time of the deposit of the deed in escrow and cuts off
the right of dower. However, it is also recognized that
other cases do not apply this doctrine of relation back so
as to cut off the right of dower. It should be noted that
when this doctrine of relation back is applied, the rela.
tion back is to the point of time when the deed is deposited in eserow. In this case no deed was ever executed (R.
102), and no escrow was established (R. 102). In
case it was contemplated by the parties to the agreement
that deeds would be executed and delivered periodically
upon receipt of the installment payments (R. 102). It
is true that the vendors, including the widow, signed an
agreement to transfer their interests by warranty deed
upon certain conditions. However, at the time of decedent's death, all of the right, title and interest of the
vendors had not been deeded to the vendees. In fact, the
vendors still held full legal title, subject to certain rights
in the vendees.
It must further be recognized that any release of
dower will operate only in favor of those persons priYy
to the instrument. The law in this respect is similar to
that previously explained in connection with the doctrine
of equitable conversion, and is explained in 28 C.J.S.,
Dower, Section 65 (a). This release of dower has been
said to be based upon principles of estoppel, and it was
so stated in the Madsen case. The limits of this estoppel
by deed are stated in 25 Am. J ur. 2d, Dower and Courtesy, Section 133 :
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"In accordance with the general rule the estoppel
must be mutual, the wife's release of dower in
connection with the husband's deed creates an
estoppel only as to persons privy to the instrument; and a grantee who procures that deed to be
set aside for fraudulent cannot claim the benefit
of estoppel. Also, if the conveyance is later set
aside as in fraud or creditors, she is not estopped
from asserting her right against the creditors."
The case of 1 n re JJfodsen's Estate, cited supra,
upon which the Tax Commission relies, gives recognition to this requirement of privity, on page 604, by stating that "there definitely is a privity of contract between
)ladsonia Realty Company and the Petersons ***."In
its facts the Madsen case is totally different from the
' case here presented. In that case the contention that the
widow's signing had effected a release of statutory
dower was, unlike the State Tax Commission of Utah,
claiming through the instrument. The Madsen case involved the possibility of double payment by the purchaser or unjust enrichment of the widow had not the release of statutory dower been found. The widow in the
Mads en case was claiming a portion of the property or
a portion of the proceeds even after full payment had
actually been made to the husband and after the widow
had received benefit from the payments. Under the circumstances, this court properly held the wife to be
from claiming a statutory dower interest.
25

CONCLUSION

The issue presented to this Court has a
far beyond the facts of this case. The amount of money
involved in this case is barely sufficient to warrant an
appeal, but the application of the doctrine of equitable
conversion will surely have a more drastic effect in subsequent cases. 'Vholesale adoption of the doctrine of
equitable conversion, as requested by the State Tax
Commission of Utah, will bring about distorted ruling.1
in other cases where the difference between real and
personal property is relevant.

It is submitted that this court should look to the
actual nature of the property rights retained by the vendors and should not resort to a fiction of law as the basi
for imposing a tax.

1

Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER &
ORVAL C. HARRISm

